Yahsat Pakistan

Pak Datacom has shifted the satellite based connectivity of around 400 National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) branches, along with connectivity serving Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and the Accountant General Pakistan Revenues (AGPR), from its previous Paksat based network to Yahsat, a satellite operator based in the United Arab Emirates. The move has triggered a serious debate over Pakistan’s control of sensitive communications infrastructure, particularly because National Bank of Pakistan handles government accounts, including accounts linked to defence related operations. The concerns were raised by former Pak Datacom Chief Executive Officer Brigadier Syed Zulfiqar Ali, Retired, in a complaint and letter addressed to the Ministry of IT and Telecommunication. Why the Pak Datacom Satellite Connectivity Shift Matters For around five years, Pak Datacom reportedly provided satellite based backup connectivity to approximately 400 NBP branches through VSAT hubs located in Karachi and Islamabad. Paksat was used as the satellite platform. The former CEO described that arrangement as a secure and largely indigenous setup. The new arrangement, however, reportedly involves both the satellite and the hub being located in the UAE. That distinction is critical. Satellite connectivity is not merely a commercial telecommunications service when it supports a financial institution responsible for government accounts. The infrastructure can become part of the broader security architecture through which sensitive financial and administrative information is transmitted. The former CEO has therefore urged the Ministry of IT and Telecommunication to examine whether shifting such connectivity outside Pakistan creates unacceptable strategic vulnerabilities. NBP Government Accounts Put Security Risk Under Spotlight The strongest criticism concerns NBP’s unique position within Pakistan’s financial system. National Bank of Pakistan serves as a major banking channel for government transactions. According to the complaint, this includes government accounts associated with defence. That makes the question considerably bigger than a routine technology procurement decision. If critical backup connectivity depends on infrastructure physically controlled outside Pakistan, policymakers need to establish exactly what information can be exposed, where network management is performed, who controls the infrastructure and what legal protections apply if a security incident occurs. The issue is particularly sensitive because the former CEO has warned that the satellite and hub are both located in the UAE. Can a VPN Completely Address the Concern? Pak Datacom reportedly maintains that the connectivity is protected through a Virtual Private Network over Yahsat. However, the former CEO argues that using a VPN does not automatically eliminate the underlying security risks. This criticism deserves serious consideration rather than being dismissed as a technical disagreement. A VPN can strengthen confidentiality and network security, but it does not change ownership of the underlying satellite infrastructure or physical location of network equipment. Pakistan’s authorities should therefore conduct an independent security assessment rather than assuming that encryption alone resolves the strategic concerns. Pakistan Needs Indigenous Satellite Infrastructure The controversy also highlights a larger weakness in Pakistan’s digital security strategy. Pakistan has increasingly digitized banking, government payments and critical infrastructure, yet dependence on foreign controlled communications infrastructure remains a strategic concern. An indigenous satellite connectivity architecture could provide greater control over critical communications, particularly for institutions handling sensitive government, financial and defence related information. The government should therefore investigate the decision transparently, assess the security implications and determine whether adequate safeguards exist under the new arrangement. The central question is not simply why Pak Datacom moved from Paksat to Yahsat. The more important question is whether Pakistan is comfortable placing critical connectivity infrastructure outside its jurisdiction when domestic alternatives are available. That question now requires a clear answer from the Ministry of IT and Telecommunication.